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Abstract
Engineering change orders (ECOs) are part of almost every development process, consuming a
significant part of engineering capacity and contributing heavily to development and tool costs. Many
companies use a support process to administer ECOs, which fundamentally determines ECO costs. This
administrative process encompasses the emergence of a change (e.g., a problem or a market-driven
feature change), the management approval of the change, up to the change's final implementation.
Despite the tremendous time pressure in development projects in general and in the ECO process in
particular, this process can consume several weeks, several months, and in extreme cases even over 1
year. Based on an in-depth case study of the climate control system development in a vehicle, we identify
five key contributors to long ECO lead times: a complex approval process, snowballing changes, scarce
capacity and congestion, setups and batching, and organizational issues. Based on the case
observations, we outline a number of improvement strategies an organization can follow to reduce its
ECO lead times.
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Abstract
Engineering change orders (ECOs) are part of almost every development process,
consuming a significant part of engineering capacity and contributing heavily to
development and tool costs. Many companies use a support process to administer
ECOs, which fundamentally determines ECO costs. We show in the case of climate
control system development in a car, how a streamlined ECO management process can
successfully complement the engineering efforts of avoiding and frontloading ECOs.
This administrative process encompasses the emergence of a change (e.g., a problem or
a market-driven feature change) to the final implementation of the ECO. We analyze
this process, and identify three categories of problems which can substantially delay
it: Congestion, Batching, and Organizational Structure. We explain and illustrate
these problems in the case and propose methods of overcoming them.
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Introduction
Engineering change orders (ECOs) are part of almost every development process.
They result from the fact that engineering is an iterative rather than a purely linear
process and are traditionally targeted toward correcting mistakes, integrating
components, or the fine tuning of a product [18]. ECOs are also an outcome of the
growing level of parallelity in today's development processes, where informationabsorbing downstream activities are often started prior to the completion of
information-supplying upstream activities and thus have to rely initially on
preliminary information [14, 16].
The negative impact of ECOs has been reported in a number of studies. ECOs
consume one-third to one-half of engineering capacity [19] and represent 20-50% of
tool costs [15], which can easily account for over US$ 100M in large development
projects. However, the management of ECOs is not well understood despite this
importance. In the past, both practitioners and researchers have tended to view ECOrelated problems more as a tragedy than as a sign of process management. In
particular, the support process administering ECOs has received little attention,
although it has been identified as one of the root causes of ECO costs [5].
It is this ECO support process that the present paper focuses on. In the case of
climate control system (CCS) development in a car, we show how a streamlined
administrative process can successfully complement the engineering efforts of
avoiding and frontloading ECOs. This administrative process encompasses the
emergence of a change (e.g., a problem or a market-driven feature change) to the final
implementation of the ECO. We analyze the process in greater detail, and identify
three categories of problems which can substantially delay this process; we then
propose methods of overcoming these problems.
Development of Climate Control Systems
In the present article we discuss the case of climate control system (CCS)
development at a large automobile company. The CCS system is one subsystem of
the overall vehicle and contains all components related to the climate environment for
the passengers, including air ventilation, air purifying, warm-up, and cool-down. We
take the CCS system as the basis for this article because it is frequently affected by
ECOs and exhibits strong couplings among the activities involved. At the same time,
it is a system that is well-suited to illustrate problems and phenomena that are typical
for other development processes as well. To quote a manager in our host
organization: "Here [in the CCS system] you find all the problems we have in the
development of new vehicles: coordination with other components, coordination of
components within the system, and information release to tooling." Along with the
dashboard, the CCS is the car subsystem having the most interfaces with other
activities (see Figure 1 for the CCS architecture).
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Couplings in the Development Process
The term "development process" applied to the development of complex products
such as automobiles, airplanes, or computers implies a strong simplification. The
complexity in the development of such systems is better captured by speaking of
processing networks: thousands of tightly coupled activities have to be kept in synch
over the course of the development of the vehicle (e.g., [7]).
User Interface

Air Output
Air

Clean Air

Air Intake

1

I
Air Guide
Air Distribution
Temp. Conditioning

Target-Value
Status-Value

Control

Positioning

Main Unit
Signal

old Air
ehydration

arm Ai

Signal

Heating Circuit

wring
Warm Water

Aux. / Park Heating
Signal

I

Cooling Circuit
Heat

Warm Water

dh►

Reduction

Radiator
Mech.
Energy
Engine

Figure 1:

Signal
Compressor

Signal Compressor

Signal
Compressor

Eng. Elect

CCS Architecture

Couplings between activities in this processing network can be classified into two
groups, product-product and product-process couplings. A product-product coupling
exists between the development of two interacting components which are part of the
same overall system. Geometric fit in the three-dimensional space of the vehicle
package is the most common interdependence. Another example is the
interdependence resulting from resource exchange, e.g. the heat energy supplied by
the en gi ne to the heating circuit, information provided from the control unit to the
main unit, or fluids exchanged between the elements of the cooling circuit. Productproduct couplings can occur between subsystems, e.g. CCS system and engine, as
well as within subsystems, e.g. control unit and fans in the main unit.
Product-process couplings describe the interdependence between an activity
developing a component or product subsystem and the activity developing the
corresponding manufacturing process. Examples from CCS development include the
coupling between the development of the filter and the preparation of the
corresponding stamping tools, or between the design of the control unit software and
the preparation of the required ASIC technology.
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The Role of Couplings for the ECO Process

The two types of couplings, product-product and product-process, are of
fundamental importance in understanding the difficulty of ECO management. In the
absence of all couplings, the process of ECOs would be simple: whenever an engineer
finds a reason to change the component(s) he/she is working on, the change is
implemented immediately. However, the presence of couplings makes it difficult to
change one activity without triggering a change in another:
• A change in a product development activity can trigger a change in another product
development activity if the corresponding components interface (product-product
coupling). For example, a change in the heating unit can activate changes in pumps
or valves in the main unit, which in turn can necessitate adapting the control unit.
• A change in a product development activity will almost always trigger a change in
its corresponding process development activity (product-process coupling).
The consequences of these couplings are significant and painfully experienced in many
development projects (e.g., empirical evidence from the electronics industries is
reported in Terwiesch et al. [21, 22]). What initially looks like a small change in one
component snowballs to other components, bridged by product-product couplings,
requiring major rework. In the same spirit, Soderberg [19] reports that in his study,
about 45% of engineering time was spent on changing components that had been
"thought to be ready." As a result, the average component was developed at least
twice. Once the ECO snowball has created a number of component changes, the
product-process couplings spring into action and spread the change requirements to
tool development. Clark and Fujimoto [5] as well as Lincke [15] report that die
development costs in vehicle development are 20-40% caused by ECOs. Moreover,
the snowballing ECOs create overall confusion and instability in the development,
leading to time delays and quality problems.
Facing these complex interdependencies and their negative consequences for a
development project, most companies have established a formal support process
designed to coordinate changes and to combat the previously discussed snowball
effect. On the research side, the importance of ECOs has been reported in a number
of studies, e.g. [4, 5, 12, 15, 19, 20, 25]. However, most of these studies have
restricted themselves to describing the symptoms of ECO problems without
providing tools to address the root causes.
In the next section, we present four principles of managing ECOs, three of which are
largely engineering-driven and only briefly presented here. The fourth principle, in
contrast, is process-related and - as we will illustrate below - provides an opportunity
for significant improvement through process redesign.

The Four Principles of Engineering Change Order Management
Engineering Change Orders are not always to the the detriment of the project, as many
cost savings or performance improvements are brought into the project in the form of
ECOs. Thus, ECOs have a role in improving the product, and efforts to eliminate
them entirely are both undesirable and unrealistic (Clark and Fujimoto [5]). However,
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one observation is almost universally true: Whatever its positive effect, the negative
effect of a change increases, the later the change is implemented. This stems from the
couplings discussed above: the later the change, the more work there is to be modified
in affected activities, be it interfacing components (product-product coupling) or the
manufacturing process (product-process coupling).
Although a general recommendation such as "freeze early and allow no further
changes" is not appropriate, there are a number of strategies a development
organization can adopt to reduce the negative consequences of ECOs. We formulate
them as "Four Principles of ECO Management", of which the first three are more
engineering-driven (and only briefly discussed here), and the last one is process-driven
and discussed in detail below.
The Four Principles of ECO Management

Approaches from the Engineering Perspective

Process Perspective

Figure 2: The Four Principles of ECO Management

Avoid unnecessary changes
New product development is an iterative process and will thus always experience
some late changes, although, in concordance with Clark and Fujimoto [5], we have
found that many ECOs are not necessary changes and can be avoided if the engineer
responsible spends more time on the first release of the component. Since, on average,
every component has to be changed once [19], many engineers feel no reason to
provide good information to other parties in their "first shot", as they know they will
have to rework the component anyway. In addition, some ECOs look beneficial at
first sight, but in the end provide only minor cost savings that do not justify the
negative non-financial externalities caused by the change. In CCS development, for
example, a change in the rubber compound for a CCS water pipe that saves 50¢ per
car at 200,000 units per year may justify a retooling investment of US$ 250,000, but
at the same time may cause so many unforeseeable interactions, that it would be better
not to implement the change. A project manager shared with us a simple rule of
thumb: "If a change pays back in a year, I go for it. If it takes two years to pay back,
we discuss it with our financial services for cash-flow details. Everything that needs a
longer amortization period, I veto." Thus, at some point in the project, it is beneficial
to freeze all fine tuning and, for quality reasons, permit only those changes that are
absolutely necessary.
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Reduce Impact

The second principle takes the occurrence of the ECO as given, and focuses on
minimizing the impact of the change. As we have previously discussed, this impact is
a function of the couplings between the activity causing the change and interdependent
other activities. Product-product couplings, and thus the ECO snowball effect, can be
best addressed by the product architecture. The more modular the overall system, i.e.
the more self-contained the different subsystems, the less likely becomes the ECO
snowball. One example from CCS development is the control software, which has
modular subsystems for its detailed parameters and for the overall system logic. An
increased air throughput can be achieved by making adjustments in parameters, which
can be changed without creating problems even as late as during after-sales service.
The importance of product architecture and modularity and their implications on the
development process have been discussed by Ulrich [24] as well as Gulati and
Eppinger [10]. Product-process couplings can be addressed through flexibility in the
manufacturing process, e.g. in the form of special materials for prototype dies [23] or
in delaying certain irreversible downstream decisions until more information is
available [5].

Detect ECOs Early

The third principle is based on the observation that ECOs become more expensive and
harder to include the later they are implemented, thus making it desirable to detect all
need for changes as early as possible in the process. This strategy of moving changes
forward in time and thereby reducing their negative impact on other activities is
frequently referred to as frontloading [9], which can be achieved by technological and
organizational means. For example, in CCS development frontloading by technology
can be achieved by using CAx tools to simulate aerodynamics within the passenger
compartment to get an early idea about passenger ergonomics. Also windshield
defrost simulation can be performed long before any hardware models are available.
Frontloading can also be achieved by organizational means and formal Design-forManufacture methods, such as early reviews with manufacturing or logistics experts
(for an overview, see [1, 8]). This enables the organization to detect, at an early stage,
changes which usually remain hidden until the corresponding downstream activity
starts working. In the project we studied, it turned out to be extremely helpful to
involve after-sales service experts in the design of the air filter system, as this
determines the frequency and ease with which the air filters have to be changed in
after-sales service.

Speedup the ECO Process

The first three principles all have their roots in the engineering domain. The fourth
principle we wish to present, and subsequently explore in more detail, refers to the
complex decision and support process which manages and coordinates the ECOs.
Like many other administrative or production processes, the ECO process often
suffers the symptoms of long response times and non transparent information flows.
That is, the time it takes between the detection of a need for a change and the time the
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ECO is finally in place is disproportionate to the amount of work it takes to perform
the intermediate steps. Blackburn [4] reports that the value-added time for ECOs in
Airframe Manufacturing is as low as 8.5%, thus for every day of actual processing
time there are two weeks of non-value-added time. Most of this is waiting time, thus
the ECO is on someone's desk, pending further processing. These results, consistent
with our observations, are shocking, especially when the enormous time pressure on
development processes in general, and the ECO process in particular, are taken into
account.
The consequences of long ECO lead times further amplify the problems of
snowballing and tool changes which we have discussed above. More specifically, they
include the following issues:
• Problems are long-lived. We have seen "open" (unsolved) problems remaining on
the agenda for over a year. This reduces the sense of urgency on the part of the
engineers involved, and can cause problems during volume-ramp-up.
Having long-lived problems means also having many of them open simultaneously.
•These changes have to be coordinated and can cause substantial difficulties of
interaction. In the days when engineering was still done on drawing boards, this
interaction did not exist because once an engineer had taken the drawings from the
archives, other engineers were unable to work on the same components. However,
in the age of CAD, coordination among engineers is more difficult as now multiple
parties can work with the same data simultaneously.
• A long response time causes late implementation of the final ECO, which is not
desirable because of the increasing change costs for tools and interfacing
components.
In the next section, we will discuss the possible reasons for such long response times
in the process and what can be done to streamline it, in order to reduce the response
times.

Sources of ECO Lead Time Problems:
Congestion, Batching, and Organizational Structure
Before we can start analyzing in greater detail why it takes so long from the detection
of a problem to the implementation of the ECO, we have to understand the steps that
are required in between. Consider a prototype test in CCS development where the
development organization finds that the rubber water pipes in the engine compartment
start leaking because of high temperatures. Figure 3 describes the steps to be taken
before the required ECO successfully solves the problem. First, after the problem is
detected in the prototype, it is typically entered in a project or quality management
system which allows a precise tracking of the problem. This requires a definition of
the scope of the problem and a first assignment of responsibility. In a next step, the
problem is discussed in different types of team meetings, including the functional team
in charge of the component (CCS development) and one or more cross-functional
teams dealing with interfacing components. Once the problem is discussed and clearly
identified, it has to be reproduced in a controlled environment to ensure that causes are
indeed well understood. Then, alternative design solutions have to be generated and
7

discussed with other interfacing modules, suppliers, and manufacturing
representatives. This ultimately results in an ECO recommendation to project
management. If project management gives the green light for implementation, and the
cost accounting group sees no reason to object, the purchasing department asks the
supplier to include the change in the coming batches of prototype parts. When new
parts with the ECO implemented arrive for prototype construction, an evaluation of
the new design solution can be made.
Definition of the Scope of the Problem
and the Engineers Responsible

Meeting of X-functional Team, e.g. Between
Engine Engineers and CCS Engineers to Discuss Causes

Exact Identification of the Problem Cause and
Reproduction of Problem in Controlled Environment

Meeting of Cross-functional Team to Discuss
Alternative Packaging Solutions

•

rmance
Accounting

Purchasing:
Ordering of
modified parts

Decision by
Project Man.

Figure 3: An Illustration of the ECO Process
The real process is even more complicated than is depicted in Figure 3, which
describes a case where the first iteration solves the problem, leaving out possible
loops. Each of the activities in Figure 3 takes between half an hour (e.g., decision by
project management) and a few days (e.g., reproduction in a controlled environment),
but even with some loops in the process, the total time required to perform the
activities does not exceed 10 days. So, how is it possible that it sometimes takes
several months or even a year until a change is implemented? What are the issues
explaining waiting times of up to 90%?
In our study, we identified three drivers of excessive waiting times. First, we
frequently found that ECOs were not implemented at the earliest point possible, but
instead collected over a period of time (e.g. a week or a month) and then processed in
a batch. Second, we observed that many organizational units were so overloaded with
work that ECO-related tasks sometimes just piled up on desks, similar to congestion
problems which are familiar in computer networks or job shop manufacturing.
Finally, we encountered a number of cultural and organizational issues which further
contributed to long waiting times. These three sources are consistent with Clark and
Fujimoto's reporting on body die development: "Short setups (corresponding to
small batches, remark from the authors), short queues, reduction of throughput time,
and streamlining of process flows all contribute to reducing downstream response time
to a given upstream change." Thus, the Clark and Fujimoto study emphasizes the
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importance of quick response to ECOs and also provides an excellent description of
ECO-management in the die development case. However, Clark and Fujimoto do not
further analyze the causes of long lead times and provide little guidance as to potential
process improvements, since their study has a different focus from ours. We now
explore the sources of long lead times in greater detail, as summarized in Figure 4.

Sources of Long EC Lea Times
Org anizational

Aspects
Strongetnphasis cos
weak emphasis on time
Culture
Olga

Consequences of Long EC Lead Times
,
any open problems at the same time, thus interaction
erimpact

Figure 4: Sources and Consequences of Long ECO Lead Times

Managing Congestion in the ECO Processes
Congestion as a result of high work load is a phenomenon frequently observed in dayto-day life, a familiar example of which is the checkout in a supermarket where
customers queue up for their turn. More often than not, the result of such queuing is
a ten-minute waiting time for an operation that takes less than a minute. But how can
this long waiting time be explained?

Analytical Background
As previously discussed, the total throughput time of a task (e.g. the lead time of an
ECO, the time to get through the checkout in a supermarket) is composed of (a) the
actual time it takes to process the task (e.g., the time it takes the project manager to
make a decision concerning the ECO) and (b) the time the task remains pending (e.g.,
the time an ECO stays on a purchaser's desk before a part order takes place).
Focusing for the moment on a single processing activity, the waiting time is known to
increase nonlinearly, and is characterized by three factors:
• the "business" of the server processing the task (technically, the capacity
utilization),
• the variability with which new tasks arrive at the server. This can be measured by
the so-called "squared coefficient of variation" (SCV), which is defined as the
squared ratio of variance and average of the inter-arrival times,

9

• the variability of the processing time at the server, measured analogously by its
SCV.
The relationship between waiting time and actual processing time is a function of
these three factors, a relationship known as the Pollaczek-Khintchine (PK) formula':
waiting time 1
= (arrival variabilioi+ process variability)
2
task time

utilization
1– utilization

The mathematically trained reader will quickly notice that the waiting time becomes
more and more the dominant expression as utilization increases. For utilization levels
close to 100%, the relationship between waiting time and task time can become even
worse than 50:1, as depicted in Figure 5. These problems occurring at a single server,
such as a cashier, are further amplified if the process consists of several operations,
based on a whole system of servers such as the ECO process from Figure 3, shown as
a system of servers in Figure 6. In such a queueing or processing network, some
operations can only be started if all previous activities have been completed, which
further contributes to long waiting times: Only after financial analysis is done and the
project manager has agreed to the proposed solution can parts be ordered.

How to Fight Congestion Problems: Analytical Background
Process

Input
•

Waiting Time to Value-added Time

Output
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• Pay at
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Queue
Server
•Line at checkout • Cashier

• ECO

• In-basket on
engineer's desk

10:1
1:1

• Engineer
0%

Utilization

100%

Figure 5: The Congestion Phenomenon in the ECO Process

In our study of the CCS development process we found a surprising similarity
between the engineering organization and a queueing network as previously discussed.
As described in Figure 6, an ECO has to go through a series of operations
(corresponding to the boxes in Figure 3). At each operation, the ECO must queue for
service because the corresponding organizational units have other tasks to work on as
well. As in any development organization, the variability of work arrival and
processing times is very high, and, at the same time, the utilization typically ranges
from 85% to 95% to cover the high fixed costs of engineering departments. Therefore,
it comes as no surprise that ECO lead times are, in some cases, more than 10 times the
1 The formula describes the ratio of waiting and processing

in the long run, i.e., if one observes the
development organization over a long period of time. The formula is a good approximation if the
utilization is high, and tasks arrive from multiple independent sources. This represents the situation
most relevant in practice. For further mathematical details, we refer the interested reader to Wolff [26]
or any other book on queueing. Typical applications of the formula include computer networks and
job shop manufacturing.
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actual processing time. The similarity of congestion problems in engineering
organizations and other queueing networks has only recently received academic
interest (prominently Adler et al. [2, 3]). Although the sources of the problem are
now at least partially known, it is not yet well understood how the situation can be
improved. Below, we propose four strategies for approaching the ECO congestion
problem in development organizations.

Figure 6: The ECO Process as a Network of Queues

Opportunities for Improvement
Congestion problems can be easily avoided by just adding extra capacity, although, for
obvious financial and political reasons, this approach is out of the question. The
objective of the improvement methods presented below is to improve ECO lead times
without adding extra capacity to the engineering organization. The methods are:
• better matching the timing of when capacity is needed and when it is provided,
• merging several tasks into one larger task,
• balancing the workload between the different units in the system,
• sharing resources across several tasks (pooling the resources).
We illustrate the potential effect of these improvements on a simplified numerical
example, which still roughly corresponds to the above described ECO process that we
observed in our host organization. In the example described here, 19 ECOs arrive, on
average, per week, at random points in time. Each ECO takes an average of two hours
to develop a solution proposal, two hours to be simulated, 45 minutes to be checked
for its cost impact, 45 minutes for new parts to be ordered, and ten minutes of the
project manager's attention for approval. The project manager (who is extremely
busy) discusses ECOs only once a week, during the weekly project team meeting,
when approval or rejection decisions are made on the spot.
Two engineers devote their time to the first step; one person performs each of the
other steps. All employees work five times eight hours a week. We can calculate the
utilizations at each step; for example, at CCS engineering it is:
Utilization = 47.5% = 2 hours/task x 19 tasks / (40 hours x 2 people).
ECOs arrive irregularly and vary in their complexity, so the SCVs of both arrivals and
processing are equal to 1 (the standard deviation equals the mean). With the help of
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the above formula, we can now find the average throughput time at each step (waiting
time plus processing time), which add up to a total of 64.2 hours (a summary of the
utilization profiles as well as the details of all calculations in this example are shown in
the Appendix). In other words, an ECO takes on average over 1.5 weeks (and in some
cases much longer) to go through one iteration of the ECO process, although it has on
average only 5.5 hours of work invested in it.

How to Fight Congestion Problems: Strategies for Improvement
Flexible Capacity

Merging of Tasks

I

Finance / A ounting
Purchasing

Two hours overtime if needed

90%

60%

0

Project Manager

Workload Balance
40%

ECO Manager

Sharing Resources
70%

q 04-q 0 q 0Hq 0
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Figure 7: Reducing Congestion in the ECO Process

The first improvement strategy addresses the basic source of queueing problems, the
mismatch between when capacity is needed and when capacity is provided, by
increasing the flexibility of the server. Remember that in the discussion above, as well
as in the presented formula, the utilization (the relationship between capacity
available and capacity required) must be less than 100% on average, as otherwise one
would fall behind in the long run. Thus, if it were possible to provide the server
capacity at the moment it is required, queueing could be completely avoided. Now
consider the simulation engineer, who faces the highest utilization of all with 95%,
working up to two hours per week overtime (for example, during lunch or at night),
whenever an ECO backlog piles up on his/her desk. On the other hand, he/she may go
home earlier if the workload is light. Thus, in the long run, the engineer does not work
more than 40 hours a week, but the work is provided just at the time when it is
needed. With this flexibility, the effective utilization factor goes down to 90.5%, thus
reducing the average throughput time for simulation from 40 hours to 21 hours, a
reduction of 48% at this station and 32% overall (again, detailed calculations for the
example are shown in the Appendix).
The first improvement strategy is targeted at an individual server, whereas the second
strategy of merging tasks looks at multiple servers collectively. Consider the three
tasks of financial analysis, approval by the module project manager, and that of
ordering parts. The ECO in the current situation must queue at each of the three
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servers, risking waiting times at each of them. In our example, we introduce a manager
whose time is devoted to performing cost analyses and ordering parts, and who also
has the authority to approve ECOs on the spot. If this manager approves ECOs
flexibly during the week (not only in the weekly meeting), the total average
throughput time of the overall process is reduced by 18 hours, or 28%. In the
company we studied, we indeed found a number of "ECO managers" who
accumulated the work that was previously done by separate organizational entities.
We also observed that some module project managers approved ECOs on the spot
while walking around through the engineering cubicles.
The third strategy of balancing workload is based on the observation that process lead
times are frequently dominated by one single activity, referred to as the "bottleneck"
activity, which is the one with the highest utilization, and determines the speed of the
whole system. In our CCS development case, the bottleneck is easily identified as the
aerodynamics simulation engineer with a utilization of 95%. At our host organization,
the corresponding group is permanently short of engineers and is thus incapable of
responding quickly to the requested ECO evaluations, because of the high expertise
required for the job. To make matters worse, the group spends a significant amount of
its time reworking CAD models created by other CCS engineers, in order to bring the
models to an accuracy level required for the simulation software. Thus, about one
third of this group's precious time is wasted on work that could equally be performed
by CCS engineers. If this preparation work is shifted in our example from the
simulation engineer to the CCS engineers, capacity utilizations become better
balanced. As a result, the total average throughput time is reduced by 33 hours, or
52%.
The last strategy, that of pooling, or sharing workloads, among engineers, is based on
reducing specialization in the development organization, requiring the capability of the
engineers to assume a broader technical responsibility. Pooling is often efficient from
a queueing perspective for three reasons. First, utilizations are balanced within the
pooled group. Second, it cannot happen that one worker is starved of work while
another has tasks waiting in his/her in-basket. Third, if one individual ECO happens
to be very complicated and time consuming, the subsequent ones are not "stuck"
behind it, but can (at least slowly) bypass it via the other pooled servers.
Pooling, however, may also have a downside. First, and most obviously, the engineers
may have to go through "mental setups" and become less productive if spread across
different tasks. Second, pooling may increase the processing variability if different
types of jobs, although homogeneous among themselves, but very different across
types, are pooled. If, for example, ECOs for the filter box (requiring air flow
analyses) and for electrical motors (requiring electrical design) were to be pooled, one
engineer would be responsible for total CCS ECOs and face a multitude of very
different tasks. This could increase the variability of the workload and thus queueing
effects, even if the engineer was perfectly cross-trained.2
2 The tradeoff is too complicated to be meaningfully included in our simplified example, so we
provide no estimate of the potential benefit.
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Pooling may not be possible for pure research tasks, which require a profound
expertise in one specific domain. However, we found it to be typically applicable for
engineering tasks such as ECOs, which comprise relatively standard operations.
Engineers can share work on similar components, such as air and water ducts for
different parts of the CCS, or on the analogous components for different car
development projects that progress in parallel.
In summary, each of these four strategies can dramatically reduce ECO lead times
without taking the brute force measure of adding capacity. The resulting streamlined
process will also be advantageous from a quality perspective, as shorter lead times
reduce the number of ECOs that are in process at the same time, thus reducing the risk
of rework being incurred by interacting changes. Finally, engineers can obtain
immediate feedback on the effectiveness of their changes, which helps them to develop
a better understanding of problems and solutions.

Managing Batching Problems
The batching of orders is one of the oldest principles in management research (Harris
1913 [11]). In the presence of some fixed setup costs or setup delay, it is
advantageous not to process every order individually, but to process a number of
them in one batch. The disadvantage of batching is called a "holding cost." In the case
of ECO batching, this holding cost results from delayed implementation: if an ECO is
not implemented on occurrence, but rather batched with other changes, the ECO lead
time is lengthened and thus the change effort is increased.

Sources of ECO Batching

In our study of CCS development, we identified four reasons for batching ECOs:
• batched information release, e.g., because of regular meeting times,
• batching for coordination reasons, e.g., for prototype building,
• batching as a result of setup costs for retooling,
• batching as a result of mental setups.
The first type of batching has received the most attention over the last years: instead
of continuously exchanging information, engineers of different functions meet only at
specified milestones or review points to discuss the current status of the project. In
the most extreme cases, the whole product engineering information is packed in one
batch and then "thrown over the wall" to process engineering. Descriptions of such
behavior can be found in Blackburn [4] or Clark and Fujimoto [5]. In our study, we
also found some cases of information batching, but batch sizes were typically very
small and created delays of only a few days. For example, ECOs were put on hold
until the next weekly scheduled meeting between different organizational units. While
this type of batching may still be of importance in some industries, we observe a
diminishing importance in the automobile industry. We will discuss this in further
detail below.
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The second type of batching is sometimes referred to as a "synch-and-stabilize
strategy" (see [6] for an example in the software industry and [17] for an example
from airplane development). Component changes and tool changes can only be
implemented during pre-scheduled prototype builds, as a new prototype vehicle
cannot be constructed for every single ECO. Typically, a car development project
includes about 70 prototype vehicles which are produced in 5-10 "waves" spread over
a one to two-year period. Since most projects include more than 1,000 ECOs, not
every one can be implemented immediately. Instead, some ECOs have to be batched
with other ECOs and then implemented in the next available prototype wave. As a
result, an engineer asking for permission to change a component by submitting an
ECO usually has to specify the prototype vehicles in which the change should be
implemented, for example, "change material for cooling pipes from wave 6 onwards".
Third, batching may be advantageous because of scale economies in implementing
ECOs. Consider, for example, the case of reworking injection molds. If every ECO
was implemented individually, every time thereafter, the mold would have to be
disassembled and transferred to the tool-makers where it would be re-cut, re-welded or
in extreme cases even scrapped. If, however, ECOs are batched, several changes can
be included in one retooling setup, thus significantly saving on setup costs.
Finally, we have observed a behavior by individual engineers that can be described as
"mental setup costs." Take, for example, an ECO that requires a repositioning of the
cooling circuit in the engine compartment of a car. Considering the package density of
today's vehicles and the size of the corresponding pipes, this task is one of the most
difficult packaging challenges which requires the engineer to "dive deep into the
problem." This includes loading all the relevant CAD files (in the past, searching out
all relevant drawings), linking the CAD data to get a model suitable for the current
problem, and to cognitively visualize the complete three-dimensional packaging
geometry. Such a setup can easily take a whole day, followed by several days during
which the engineer is likely to devote all his time to the particular problem he is
working on.

Opportunities for Improvement
Each of the four batching types may result from a rational decision: batching of ECOs
is not an inefficient practice in the presence of the described situations (e.g., Loch and
Terwiesch [16]). The larger the ECO batch size, the longer is the average time
between problem detection and final ECO implementation. The previously discussed
disadvantages of long ECO lead times represent batch "holding costs." However,
because of setups, it would not be wise to just ignore all batching reasons and to
implement every ECO on occurrence. The only way of improving this tradeoff lies in
addressing the sources of batching, i.e. the setups, reducing batch sizes through a
setup cost reduction. We now present three strategies with this objective:
• Communication technologies,
• rapid prototyping,
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• project dedication and easy-to-use CAx.
The first setup reduction strategy in managing ECOs focuses on the fixed time
investment required for a physical meeting of organizational units. With the growing
power of CAx technologies, in which the automobile industry heavily invests, such
setups can be relatively easily reduced. The better the IT platform, the easier it is to
forward information without physical meetings. ECOs are implemented, using the
current CAD data of the project team, and an administrative warning to all affected
parties is sent out by e-mail or via the corporate intranet. In our study, we found this
procedure to be relatively advanced within the company. However, significant
problems arose in the electronic integration with suppliers and the cooperating
external engineering groups. One explanation for these problems given by our
interviewees was the high financial investment necessary to obtain CAx hardware and
software, to continuously purchase the most recent release of the system, and
especially to develop internal expertise for such systems. These investments proved
too great for some of the many small- and medium-sized enterprises involved in the
process.
The second strategy reduces the importance in the development process of traditional
prototypes, which are the source of the second batching type previously discussed.
Again based on the recent advances in CAx technology, it is now more and more
feasible to replace such physical prototypes with what are frequently referred to as
"virtual prototypes" [23]. While such virtual prototypes were previously only suited
to discussing design decisions, now many other functions, traditionally taken by
physical prototypes, can be performed on the computer. Examples from CCS
development include:
• defrost simulation of a windshield,
• analysis of air flow dynamics in the passenger compartment,
• computation of air throughput of the air filter.
A second trend which has emerged in recent years is the application of rapid
prototyping technologies as another way of substituting traditional prototypes. This
trend has been facilitated by new prototype materials, such as paper and
photolithography.
The last strategy we wish to mention addresses mental setups. A first step in dealing
with this problem has already been taken by allowing the engineer to access all
electronic drawings from his/her CAD workstation. Most of the more senior
engineers we talked to still remember vividly the time when an engineer had to go to
the drawing archives and physically take out the drawings for a vehicle subsystem.
Despite the progress of CAD technology, substantial differences persist across
companies in how easily these systems can be used and thus how large the setups for
getting started are. While some companies have achieved easy-to-use CAD [9], many
others still wrestle with complicated CAD systems and a lack of CAD-trained
engineers. Engineers who schedule themselves special "CAD-days", as they are
forced to reserve a CAD station in advance, are still the rule in most industries. A
second opportunity of reducing mental setups lies in the division of work between

engineers. While it is advantageous to have engineers devote their time to components
requiring profound functional expertise (e.g., the ASIC technology in the control unit),
in other cases more integrative in nature (e.g., packaging of a cooling circuit), it may be
better to have an engineer assigned to a vehicle project. Aligning work assignments
with the knowledge requirements of the tasks saves the engineer substantial changeover costs between technologies or projects.

Managing the Organizational Aspects: Cultural Differences and Process
Knowledge
In addition to the congestion and batching delays described above, we also identified
two organizational aspects which contribute to long ECO lead times, namely cultural
differences and lack of process knowledge across group boundaries.
First, in the development organization we studied, we found a dominating culture of
cost management, and, at the same time, relatively little emphasis on time
management. This was mirrored in the measurement and incentive mechanisms in
place, which were strongly targeted toward staying within the budget. If an engineer
created a design solution exceeding the target by a few cents, multiple alarm
mechanisms were triggered, escalating ultimately all the way up to senior management.
If, however, some crucial information was provided with several weeks' delay, no
measurement system was in place to detect the delay problem. Another example of
this cost culture is the rather complex ECO approval process, some aspects of which
we have discussed above. Multiple levels of signatures were required to spend extra
money, but, again, no signature was required if time-critical tasks were not completed
on time. As a result of this, the development organization has only recently realized
the importance of short ECO lead times. Prior to that, time performance could not be
measured, and ECO management did not receive the same attention as it does today.
Second, and partly related to the first point, we found a substantial cultural difference
between the two groups involved in the process. From previous studies, we had
expected to find such a culture gap between product and process engineering, but
these two groups were surprisingly close to each other. However, a gap was found
between the group of engineers in charge of integrating the process and the engineers
responsible for the actual detailed engineering. The first group was relatively small
(about 30-40 people) fully dedicated to the vehicle project, and reporting through a
flat hierarchy to the overall vehicle project manager. Although almost all of them were
electrical or mechanical engineers with a passion for cars, they resembled rather, in
many ways, a typical management profile: using cellular phones, dressing in suits,
using e-mail and intranets, permanently communicating (including shouting from one
corner of the building to another), and sharing an open office space with no walls
except for those enclosing a few meeting rooms. Despite their technical expertise,
surprisingly few of them were skilled in using CAx technology, which prompted from the second group - the nickname "A4-engineers" (which refers to the fact that in
the "old days," sophisticated engineering drawings were done on large sheets of paper
clipped to large drawing boards, whereas administrative procedures were written on
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A4-format paper). The second group was part of the functional engineering
organization, had the same engineering background, the same passion for technology,
and also the same pay level. However, there was a different atmosphere predominant
in this part of the company: long corridors of closed doors, virtual silence in the
buildings, and people sitting behind large drawing tables now used as room separators.
This difference in culture was especially apparent when it came to agreeing on
priorities between project organizations and the functional organization, which served
several projects simultaneously. Of course the project engineers had a clear view of
what was important: their project, and most importantly ECOs! The functional
engineers, however, had plenty of other activities to work on, including other vehicle
development projects, consultation with after-sales services, pre-development
projects, and so on. As a result of the cultural differences, project engineers often had
the impression that functional engineers were unwilling to respond to their requests.
This led to increased tension between the parties and frequent interventions on the
part of senior management for minor problems.
Third, we observed a lacking awareness of the consequences of an ECO. Talking to
both sides, engineers requesting changes and engineers being affected by these changes,
we observed the case where a CCS water pipe was to be re-positioned to go through
the bulkhead fire wall at a point 2 cm away from that marked on the initial plan.
Asked for the cost of the change, the ECO-requesting engineer estimated about US$
10,000: "Just some minor adjustment in the stamping tools." The response from the
engineer in charge of developing the fire wall, who was affected by the change,
fundamentally differed: "Some holes we can change, but not this one. And most
importantly, not now. Changing the hole today will cost us several US$ 100,000
because the anchoring of the car on the assembly line is affected."
There are no easy answers to these organizational problems, although some
recommendations, which are summarized in Figure 8, are listed below.

Opportunities for Improvement
From coordination to integration: Over the past years, most advanced development
organizations have made progress in bringing engineers together to exchange
information. Cross-functional teams and early manufacturing involvement are now the
norm rather than best practice and have led to tremendous improvements in
development performance. However, in in the words of one of our interviewees:
"There's more to developing vehicles than just communication." Hauptman and lErji
[13) emphasize the importance of addressing the interdependencies between activities
- and thus the need for information exchange - not only by coordinating the tasks, but
especially by integrating the corresponding organizational units. These authors define
coordination as an information exchange to keep different, interdependent activities in
synch. Coordination is typically achieved by means of meetings, e-mails, intranets or
CAx technologies. Integration, however, goes further than this, as it attempts to
overcome organizational and cultural divides between different organizational units.
Such divides typically result from a specialization of work and can be addressed by
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job rotation and joint working platforms instead of communication teams, and
common activities such as visits or conferences.

Cost Incentives
Engineering vs. Management Culture

No measures for
tracking ECO times
Organization has
only limited awareness
of the ECO lead time

No agreement on what
tasks have high priority
Important tasks go to the
"End of Line", instead
of being prioritized

Unawareness of ECO
consequences

Engineer requesting the
ECO does not know what
costs (s)he creates downstream
Creating of ECOs that
later turn out to be too
expensive

Time measurement / incentives
Exchange Meta-Information
From Coordination to Integration

Figure 8: Approaches to Organizational Structure
Second, although most development organizations have progressed beyond a tradition
of craftsmanship, some of its cultural aspects still exist. A strong passion for a
perfect product is a great asset to an engineering organization and helps create
competitive advantage in the products offered. In the case of ECOs, this passion
becomes evident in an enormous flexibility of including late changes to fine tune the
product. However, such a product focus is frequently associated with a tendency to
overlook process issues, causing delays or quality losses in the launch of the product.
There is no reason for criticizing the engineer's ambition to create excellent products,
but there is more to being a successful development organization, as is best captured
by a comment of the head of development in our host company: "Over the last
decades, our company has been renowned for its product excellence. If we want to
make profits in the future, we must reach the same excellence in our processes."
Creating performance measures which not only capture product performance and cost
aspects, but which provide a guidance towards time measurement is an important first
step in that direction.
Finally, unpleasant downstream surprises with regard to the consequences of ECOs
can be avoided if the organizational units exchange what we may call "metainformation," which is independent of individual ECOs in process. Such metainformation could, for example, be provided by the engineer developing the fire wall
as: "Hole x is crucial for the current design and can only be changed at high costs, hole
y can be easily moved within a radius of 15 mm, and in re gi on z we can not allow any
holes." Such information could be used by others, CCS engineers, for example, in
order to guide their development work. In the given example, the CCS engineer would
not waste any time working on a design alternative with a changed hole x, but from the
start build his/her change around a repositioned hole y. Other examples of such metainformation are given in [14].

19

Discussion and Outlook on Future Research
In this article we have outlined a process-based view of ECO management. We have
shown that many of the problems related to ECOs have their roots in a complicated
and congested administrative process. We then outlined three sources of long ECO
lead times and proposed tools for overcoming them. In a highly parallel development
process, more engineering tasks must start with low quality information. Thus, the
importance of ECO management will grow even further in the coming years [15]. This
is also reflected by our host company's recent decision to elevate ECO management to
one of their six core development processes.
Future research should respond to this growing importance, and we see three
promising avenues to follow. First, the models presented here simplify the
complexity of engineering projects in order to illuminate the structure of the problem.
Future research will have to provide richer, more detailed models that better describe
the multitude of tasks flowing in the processing network called "development
organization". Second, the role of CAx technologies in managing ECOs deserves
further attention. Such technologies may in the future be capable of automatically
detecting problems in the current design (to some degree, this capability already exists,
e.g., for fit problems in packaging). Automatic problem detection and ease of
including changes in virtual prototypes will bring about a fundamental reconsideration
of the ECO process. Finally, organizational integration, as outlined above, does not
automatically follow the introduction of new powerful technologies. One manager at
our host organization commented: "We have all the tools, but we don't know how to
make our people use them all effectively." How the cultural divide between
organizational units can be overcome and an overall culture of process management be
achieved, need to be further studied.
A resulting more detailed understanding of the ECO process will allow development
organizations to reduce the negative impact of multiple late changes and to move
toward achieving both product and process excellence.
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Appendix
To estimate the benefits of the improvements discussed in the Section on queueing,
consider the following simplified example. ECO arrival rates and average processing
times m at each station are shown in Figure A-1. All SCVs are assumed to be 1, and
each engineer works 40 hours per week.

Figure A-1: Numerical example of improvement strategies
CCS and simulation engineers are dedicated to this ECO process. The accounting and
purchasing specialists have other responsibilities also, but give priority to this
process, so their effective utilizations and throughput times can be calculated without
regard to other work. The project manager has many responsibilities and decides on
ECOs once a week, during the weekly project meeting. The resulting (effective)
utilizations and throughput times (estimated from the PK formula) are shown in Table
A-1.3
Station

CCS

Simulation

Finance

Project
Manager
8

Purchasing

47.5
95
36
36
Utilization,
in %
1.6
20**
TPT (average throughput
2.6*
40
1.6
time), in hours
64.2***
Total TPT,
in hours
*
This TPT is simulated, since no analytical expression is available for a multi-server station (2
engineers serving the same stream of ECOs).
** The project manager decides on ECOs once per week, so on average, an ECO is pending half a
week
*** The sum of all TPTs except the time for the cost analysis, which runs in parallel to and is
dominated by the TPT for the project manager's decision.

Table A-1: Utilizations and average throughput times
Flexible capacity. If the simulation engineer is capable of providing two extra hours
of work whenever needed, the effective utilization is reduced to 38/42 = 90.5%. From
the PK formula, we can estimate the resulting TPT as 21 hours, a reduction of 48%
3 In this example, the stations are analyzed as if they were isolated from one another. This is exact
when the SCVs are equal to 1, and it provides a reasonable approximation for more general cases.
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for this process step and of 28% overall. This reduction shows how big the throughput time (TPT) improvement is from a small reduction in utilization when the
engineer has a heavy workload.
Merging Groups. We replace the accounting analyst, purchaser and project manager
with one dedicated "ECO manager" who analyses and approves ECOs on an ongoing
basis (not only at the weekly meeting). If we assume that by analyzing the ECO, the
manager does not need the extra 10 minutes for making an approval decision, the
workload of this manager per ECO is 0.75 + 0.75 = 1.5 hours, for a total utilization of
71.25%. From the PK formula, we get a TPT for this combined part of the process of
3.5 hours, a reduction of 84% for this part of the process and 28% overall.
Offloading the Bottleneck. As explained in the text, 30% of the simulation time for
an ECO consists of file preparation that could equally be performed by the CCS
engineers. If these 0.6 hours per ECO on average are shifted to CCS, the utilizations
are balanced at 61.6% for CCS engineering and 66.5% for simulation. The resulting
TPTs can be estimated at 6 hours for CCS (via simulation) and 4.2 hours for the
simulation engineer (from the PK formula). The total of 10.2 hours represents a 77%
reduction for this part of the process and 52% overall.
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